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CHAPTER 17
Enforcing International Human Rights




Since the human rights promises in the United Nations
Charter were made nearly fifty years ago, civil rights and
civil liberties lawyers in the United States have tried to use
international human rights law in their cases for human
rights victims in this country.' The results of these efforts,
with some limited exceptions, have been quite modest.
Nor has United States domestic legislation, with few
exceptions, been influenced much by the force of interna-
tional human rights law. Even in the area of refugee rights,
where the apparent influence of international law has been
greatest, domestic pressures have frequently overcome U.S.
commitment to international law. The Clinton administra-
tion's adherence to the Bush administration's Haitian inter-
diction program is the most recent illustration of this reality.
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There is a continuing disparity between the U.S. govern-
ment's commitment to the application of international
human rights norms in the rest of the world and its willing-
ness to accept these obligations fully within its own borders.
This feature of U.S. political and legal culture was demon-
strated with unmistakable clarity by the handling of the
three human rights treaties that emerged from the Senate
during the Reagan/Bush years.
The Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture
and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) all won Senate approval
only after they had been saddled with reservations, declara-
tions, and understandings designed to ensure that these
treaties would have virtually no domestic legal effect in
enhancing human rights.
Even the relatively minor respects in which these treaties
would have protected human rights beyond current domes-
tic U.S. law and practice were not tolerated in the ratification
process. The Bush administration even refused to accede to
the ICCPR provision outlawing the execution of pregnant
women, which would have merely brought U.S. law in line
with existing U.S. practice on this noncontroversial issue.
This limited acceptance of obligations under major interna-
tional human rights treaties not only sends an unfortunate
message to the rest of the world about the actual importance
of their own human rights obligations; it also reinforces the
notion that international human rights law should not play
an important role in domestic human rights issues. Until
U.S. political leaders send a different message, it is likely that
international human rights law will continue to play a mar-
ginal role in domestic civil rights and civil liberties cases or
debates. U.S. failure to accept these obligations fully may
also undermine U.S. foreign policy efforts to persuade other
governments to adhere to international human rights law.
The Clinton administration has proclaimed its support for
the ratification of all major human rights treaties now pend-
ing before the Senate3 - namely, the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the American Convention on
Human Rights - and also of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.4 This is a positive development but it remains
to be seen whether the administration will be committed to
ensuring that international human rights standards become
a significant element of U.S. law and policy.
The second section of this chapter will assess the role that
international human rights standards play in U.S. domestic
law and practice. There has been a great deal of progress in
the development of international human rights law in the
past fifty years. There has been some progress in using this
growing body of law in U.S. forums, but this progress has
been excruciatingly slow.
The third section proposes a series of recommended steps
that the Clinton administration should take to make interna-
tional human rights standards a more integral part of U.S.
domestic legal and political life. Some of these recommenda-
tions are quite modest. Others are more far-reaching. None
has been made based on its political feasibility. All are
premised on the propositions that strong presidential leader-
ship is required for international human rights standards to
play a serious role in U.S. domestic human rights law and
policy and that it is important for this transformation to take
place in the near future.
B. The History of International Human Rights
Law in U.S. Human Rights Law and Practice5
As is true for domestic human rights law, international
human rights law consists of both positive law (in this case,
treaties and other international agreements) and unwritten
law (in this case, it is called "customary international law").
The U.S. record respecting both types of international human
rights law has been disappointing.
The United States has ratified few international human
rights treaties, has encumbered those few ratifications with
numerous "reservations," "understandings," and "declara-
tions" that severely limit the impact of ratification within the
United States, and has treated most such treaties as not being
enforceable in domestic courts under the "non-self-executing
treaty" doctrine.
Likewise, with few exceptions, U.S. courts have not treated
customary international human rights law as binding in
domestic litigation. Customary international law norms have
been confined largely to an interpretive role, in which courts
have relied on them for guidance in interpreting ambiguous
aspects of domestic constitutional or statutory provisions.
Even that interpretive reliance has not occurred with suffi-
cient clarity or regularity to make it a significant, systemati-
cally used element of domestic legal analysis.
Beyond the reality that international human rights law has
had little impact in U.S. domestic litigation, it has also had a
modest impact on the formulation and implementation of
domestic policy generally. Perhaps because of the limited
ability to enforce international human rights norms in U.S.
courts, officials at all levels of government have rarely con-
sidered international human rights standards in the formula-
tion or execution of government policies.
1. International Human Rights Treaties
Of the more than forty international human rights treaties
to which the United States could be a party, it has ratified
only a handful altogether, and only one of the major interna-
tional human rights treaties, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).6 The United States has
been especially reluctant to ratify human rights treaties that
have a potential domestic impact.
The United States has not ratified one of the two major
United Nations Covenants that, together with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 7 and ICCPR, constitute the
"International Bill of Rights":8 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).9 Nor has
the United States ratified the major applicable regional
human rights treaty, the American Convention on Human
Rights.10 The other unratified human rights treaties that
could be especially fertile sources for expanding protection
of rights in the United States include the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination," the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women,12 and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
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Although the United States recently ratified the ICCPR,14
that ratification was qualified by so many reservations, dec-
larations, and understandings that concerns have been
raised that it may have little or no domestic effect in the
United States."
Indeed, the United States apparently issued a reservation,
declaration, or understanding whenever the ICCPR's provi-
sions seemed to prescribe more protective human rights
guarantees than those currently recognized under U.S. law.
Therefore, even assuming that the United States has satisfied
the international standards for ratification of the ICCPR, that
ratification may not be very meaningful in terms of extend-
ing the human rights of people in the United States. 6
Some international human rights experts argued that these
extensive qualifications undermined the very validity of the
U.S. ratification under international law and concluded that
no ratification was a lesser evil than a ratification so riddled
with limitations. 7 Others believe that the ratification of the
ICCPR even with these limitations offers many new tools for
domestic civil rights and civil liberties advocates. 18
It is too early to tell what impact ratification of the ICCPR
will have. The way in which the Clinton administration
responds to the obligations imposed by the ICCPR may be
the most significant factor in answering this question.
Another key limitation the United States placed on its rati-
fication of the ICCPR was the declaration that the ICCPR
provisions are not "self-executing," which means that they
are not judicially enforceable against federal or state govern-
ments in United States courts. 9 As it did with the ICCPR, the
United States has expressly qualified its ratification of other
international human rights treaties, including the Conven-
tion Against Torture, with the proviso that such treaties are
not "self-executing."
Initiated by Chief Justice John Marshall, 0 the doctrine that
a treaty may be "non-self-executing" means that even with-
out an express declaration to this effect, the provisions of
U.S.-ratified human rights treaties might not be held to be
enforceable in domestic courts in any event. In fact, the his-
tory of judicial responses to international human rights pro-
visions in treaties leaves no ground for optimism.
The leading case is Sei Fujii v. California,21 in which the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that the human rights provisions
of the UN Charter were not self-executing. Of the various
international instruments to which the United States is a
party, the UN Charter was potentially the most fruitful
source of rights protection in domestic courts, especially in
an era in which the de jure discrimination practiced in so
much of the United States was squarely at odds with the
central nondiscrimination norms of the Charter and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.22 Therefore, Sei Fujii
was particularly damaging to the prospective domestic
incorporation of international human rights law.
This much criticized decision 23 was not appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, nor has the Supreme Court ever
expressly addressed the UN Charter's domestic enforceabili-
ty in any other case. Nevertheless, most subsequent deci-
sions throughout the United States have uncritically
followed Sei Fujii in holding that the UN Charter's human
rights provisions are not self-executing, and therefore are not
directly incorporated into U.S. law. 24 Although extradition
treaties25 and treaties limiting the scope of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over criminal offenses26 have been found to be
self-executing, courts have consistently held the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international human
rights instruments to be non-self-executing.
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Equally important, Congress has never acted to implement
the human rights provisions of the UN Charter or the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights directly. As a result, the
human rights provisions of the Charter and Universal Decla-
ration have played a marginal role in United States domestic
civil liberties and civil rights policies.
In summary, the United States has ratified only a few of
the international human rights treaties that could potentially
expand protection of human rights domestically, and even
those few treaties are prevented from actually serving that
function for several reasons: because the instruments of rati-
fication expressly declare that these treaties are non-self-exe-
cuting or a court determines them to be non-self-executing;
because Congress has not passed implementing legislation;
and because their ratification is subject to limiting reserva-
tions, declarations, and understandings.
2. Customary International Human Rights Law
The United States record in terms of incorporating the
other major category of international human rights law -
customary international human rights principles - is as dis-
appointing as its record with treaty law.
Customary international human rights law, as the interna-
tional analogue to unwritten common law in the domestic
sphere, consists of those principles that are so widely accept-
ed by the community of nations that they are binding even
on states that have not ratified treaties embodying them.21
Only states that have consistently objected to the principle
during its process of emergence are not bound by it.29
While treaty provisions are not themselves sources of cus-
tomary international principles, they constitute evidence that
such principles exist. The three classic types of such evi-
dence, as enumerated by the Supreme Court, are "the works
of jurists[;]... the general usage and practice of nations;
[and] . . . judicial decisions." 3° Other types of evidence
include resolutions of international bodies, national legisla-
tion, public declarations by international and national offi-
cials, and diplomatic correspondence and instructions.
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It is usually difficult to document that a principle has
achieved the general recognition necessary to establish it as
customary international law.32 Nevertheless, international
jurists have made credible arguments that many internation-
al human rights principles have achieved that degree of gen-
eral acceptance.
Some judges and scholars have made the stronger argu-
ment that most international human rights principles of cus-
tomary law are included in the subset of customary norms
that are so fundamental as to be "peremptory,"33 or jus
cogens, and thus not subject to being changed by
agreement.3 4 It has been argued that the international human
rights standards embodied in the International Bill of Rights
are at least "rapidly establishing" themselves as peremptory
principles, if they have not already attained that status.35
Similarly, the International Court of Justice has declared that
rules concerning the basic human rights are "obligations
erga omnes (owing by each state to all persons)."
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Not all commentators agree that all international human
rights principles currently constitute nonderogable norms
under the derogation provisions of human rights treaties.37
In contrast, there appears to be more agreement among
international law scholars that many of these principles are
included in customary international law. 38 During the Carter
administration, the U.S. government took the position that
both the ICCPR and the ICESCR embody customary interna-
tional law principles. 9
Despite the solid legal foundation for incorporating cus-
tomary international human rights norms into domestic law,
United States courts actually do so only rarely. In their recent
comprehensive survey of the relevant judicial rulings, Pro-
fessors Anne Bayefsky and Joan Fitzpatrick concluded:
United States courts generally manifest a deep reluctance
to embrace international human rights law and to use it as an
effective tool to redress abuses. This reluctance is born partly
of unfamiliarity and perhaps a degree of intellectual laziness,
but it also appears to stem from concerns about institutional
competence and deference to the political branches."
Professors Bayefsky and Fitzpatrick grouped the cases con-
cerning the integration of customary international human
rights law into domestic law in three categories: 1) cases
involving the specific incorporation of international law into
United States law through the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA); 2) cases in which a right of action or a defense to
criminal prosecution was directly based on international
law; and 3) cases in which international law was used as an
aid in interpreting United States law. In all three categories,
they show, customary international human rights norms
have had scant impact on United States law. They explained:
American courts generally avoid the application of interna-
tional human rights norms or rely on the norms for reinforce-
ment of results actually premised on some alternative source
of values. Only in a few rare cases, primarily under the
ATCA, does international human rights law appear to be the
driving force supplying the rule of decision.
a. Alien Tort Claims Act cases.
The ATCA provides federal district court jurisdiction over
suits by aliens involving torts committed in violation of
treaties or "the law of nations." Although it had rarely been
used before then, new life was breathed into the ATCA by a
1980 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.41 The Second Circuit held
that the ATCA created an implied cause of action for viola-
tion of customary international human rights standards.
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The Filartiga court recognized that international law, or "the
law of nations," is a dynamic concept that should be con-
strued in accordance with the current customs and usages of
civilized nations, as articulated by jurists and
commentators.43 It specifically held that U.S. law directly
incorporated customary international law principles pro-
hibiting deliberate government torture.44
The Filartiga decision created hope in the international
human rights community that it presaged a trend toward
increasing incorporation of customary international human
rights norms into domestic law. 45 However, that develop-
ment has not occurred." Some subsequent opinions by fed-
eral and state court judges also have treated customary
international human rights norms as directly enforceable.47
Other subsequent decisions, though, have criticized Filarti-
ga's holding that the Alien Tort Claims Act automatically
provides a cause of action for violation of established cus-
tomary international law norms.4 Of more general concern,
even some courts agreeing with this holding have empha-
sized that few norms have been established widely enough
to be recognized as part of customary international law.49
Finally, in many cases brought under the ATCA, various
jurisdictional doctrines bar relief. These include sovereign
immunity,50 head of state immunity diplomatic immunity,51
and the act of state doctrine. 2
A recent development of great potential significance was
the passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in
1992.53 Although the TVPA strengthens and expands the cov-
erage of the ATCA, its primary significance is that it is a
modern expression of support from the political branches of
government that U.S. courts should be open to victims of
international human rights violations for redress. Signifi-
cantly, though, the TVPA is focused on torture and summary
execution committed by foreign officials abroad. The Con-
gress has not shown a similar interest in providing remedies
for international human rights violations committed by U.S.
officials.5
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b. Cases in which claims or defenses are directly based on cus-
tomary international human rights norms.
A prime example of this use of international norms is the
opinion of the federal district court in Kansas in Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, decided in 1980.1 The court granted a
writ of habeas corpus to a "Marielito," a Cuban who fled to
the United States in the 1980 Mariel boat lift, holding that his
indefinite detention in a penitentiary violated a customary
international standard. As an "excludable" alien, he was not
protected by the U.S. Constitution, nor did statutes or other
sources of domestic law clearly protect him from indefinite
detention. Nevertheless, the district court ordered him
released strictly on the basis of customary international law.
The court explained:
[E]ven though the indeterminate detention of an excluded
alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitution
or our statutory laws, it is judicially remediable as a violation
of international law. Petitioner's continued, indeterminate
detention on restrictive status in a maximum security prison,
without having been convicted of a crime in this country or a
determination having been made that he is a risk to security
or likely to abscond, is unlawful ....
The district court opinion in Rodriguez-Fernandez repre-
sents a high-water mark to date in U.S. courts' direct incor-
poration of customary international human rights norms
into domestic law, as the actual, stand-alone basis for a claim
or defense. Because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
grounded its affirmance of the lower court's grant of the
habeas corpus petition on another rationale, 7 the district
court's specific holding has no precedential effect. Moreover,
in ruling on other Marielito challenges to their indefinite
detention, other circuit courts have expressly rejected the
argument that these detainees had an actionable claim under
international human rights law. 8
In addition to the U.S. courts' general reluctance to incor-
porate international human rights law in all cases, they have
specifically declined to recognize such law as the basis for a
defense to a criminal prosecution for a particular reason:
because the foreign policy implications are deemed to give
rise to nonjusticiable "political questions." Such defenses
have been raised, and dismissed as nonjusticiable, in prose-
cutions for demonstrating against nuclear weapons,5 9 for
giving sanctuary to Central Americans fleeing civil war,60 for
draft resistance, 61 and for nonpayment of taxes.62 In fact,
prosecutors are increasingly making successful threshold
motions to exclude all mention of international law in crimi-
nal cases.6
c. Cases regarding interpretive use of customary international
human rights norms.
In contrast to U.S. courts' current reluctance to view them-
selves as bound directly by international human rights prin-
ciples, they are much more willing to invoke such principles
- whether embodied in treaties or in other manifestations of
customary international law - to guide the interpretation of
domestic legal norms. There is also a scholarly consensus
supporting this interpretive use of international human
rights norms in domestic litigation.64 Even positivists, who
generally resist incorporating customary international law
norms into U.S. domestic law, recognize that judges should
be free to resolve ambiguities, or to fill gaps, in positive law
by reference to universally accepted legal principles.5
The interpretive reliance on customary international
human rights law is consistent with the well-established
canon of construction that domestic law should be construed
to avoid a violation of international law. Chief Justice John
Marshall expressed this precept in an 1804 decision: "[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations, if any other possible construction remains...."66
In 1989, Professor Jordan Paust of the University of Hous-
ton Law Center published a comprehensive survey of the
interpretive use of customary international human rights
norms by U.S. courts throughout history.67 He concluded:
"[M]ost of the Supreme Court Justices throughout United
States constitutional history have recognized that human
rights can provide useful content for the identification, clari-
fication and supplementation of constitutional or statutory
norms." 68 Moreover, he showed that the Supreme Court's
interpretive reliance on customary international human
rights norms has been steadily increasing.69 He also demon-
strated that the many Supreme Court Justices who have
invoked customary international human rights concepts
have spanned disparate jurisprudential approaches.
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Despite the fact that U.S. courts have relied upon custom-
ary international norms to assist in interpreting domestic
law with relative frequency - certainly far more frequently
than such norms have been deemed directly incorporated
into U.S. law - this reliance has not been done in a suffi-
ciently clear, consistent, and principled fashion. As Profes-
sors Bayefsky and Fitzpatrick explained:
Those courts which do make use of international law
sources as an aid to interpretation usually (a) do not tend to
justify its introduction by references to the principle of con-
sistency with international obligations, nor (b) concern them-
selves with establishing the binding quality of the source by
proving that it is truly customary international law. This ten-
dency impedes the development of dear and consistent prin-
ciples concerning the interpretive relevance and importance
of customary human rights norms in U.S. law.
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The Rehnquist Court's most recent discussion of this issue
offers little ground for optimism about the use of customary
international human rights norms in U.S. courts. Until
recently, the Supreme Court had consistently invoked inter-
national human rights norms in determining whether an
application of the death penalty constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.72 For example, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,3 in 1988, the
Court held that a death sentence imposed on an offender
who was fifteen years old at the time of his offense violated
the Eighth Amendment. Writing for the plurality, Justice
John Paul Stevens cited international legal standards in rea-
soning that the sentence "offended civilized standards of
decency."74 He noted that the leading Western European
countries, as well as the Soviet Union, prohibited executions
of individuals who were juveniles at the time of their crimes.
He also cited two treaties that the United States had not rati-
fied that explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties: the
ICCPR and the American Convention on Human Rights.75 In
his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia implied that international
standards should not be taken into account in interpreting
the U.S. Constitution.76
One year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky,7 the Supreme Court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not bar the
imposition of the death penalty on someone who was six-
teen or seventeen years old at the time of committing the
crime in question. The majority opinion was written by Jus-
tice Scalia, who took this opportunity to reiterate his views
about the irrelevance of international law and practices in
construing the United States Constitution. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion, as well as Justice Brennan's dissent, well
state the two widely divergent possible views about inter-
preting domestic law in light of international customary law.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion recognized that the key
question in Eighth Amendment analysis is whether the chal-
lenged punishment is contrary to "evolving standards of
decency." 78 In determining what those standards are, Justice
Scalia explained, "we have looked not to our own [that is,
the Justices' own personal] conceptions of decency, but to
those of modem American society as a whole." Then, in a
footnote to this sentence, Justice Scalia emphasized his rejec-
tion of the theory that international law plays even an inter-
pretive role in United States jurisprudence. He wrote:
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency
that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners
and their various amici that the sentencing practices of other
countries are relevant. While "the practices of other nations,
particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determin-
ing whether a practice uniform among our people is not
merely an historical accident but rather so 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely
in our mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as
well," they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amend-
ment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our
people.8
In contrast, Justice Brennan's dissent stated: "Our cases
recognize that objective indicators of contemporary stan-
dards of decency in the form of legislation in other countries
is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis .... In
addition. .. three leading human rights treaties ratified or
signed by the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death
penalties."
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As disappointing as the Supreme Court's recently con-
stricted view about the interpretive value of customary inter-
national norms is, the impact of that view is less significant
than that of typical Supreme Court rulings. In contrast with
domestic law, there is no judicial hierarchy in the interpre-
tive use of customary international law. 2 Accordingly, both
lower federal courts and state courts may make interpretive
use of international norms, independent of the U.S. Supreme
Court's rulings in this area. In fact, lower federal court
judges have relied on international human rights standards
in construing both constitutional and statutory provisions,
and state court judges have done the same.83 Additionally,
legislative and executive branch officials, at all levels of gov-
ernment, are free to take account of customary international
law norms in their official acts.
Historically, though, customary norms have not been taken
into account by government officials. Likewise, what have
been termed "quasi-legal standards" and international
guidelines have not been taken into account consistently, or
even frequently, by government officials in formulating or
implementing government policy.4
While there are isolated examples of domestic United
States enforcement of international human rights standards,
be they customary norms or "quasi-legal standards," the fed-
eral government's failure to take action to enforce, or at least
encourage compliance with, international human rights
standards has severely limited their domestic impact.
3. The Relevance of International Human Rights Standards
for the Protection of Civil Liberties in the United States
One of the reasons why the United States is lagging in its
support for international human rights treaties is the wide-
spread - and generally accurate - attitude that U.S. civil
rights and civil liberties law is more protective of individual
rights than the laws of any other country, so Americans do
not need these international protections.
This objection raises an important point - that interna-
tional human rights norms would be incorporated into
domestic law only to the extent that the international stan-
dards are more right-protective than the domestic
standards.8 5 To the extent that international human rights
standards are less protective than the corresponding U.S.
norms, the former would not supersede the latter. To clarify
this, the United States should qualify its ratification of any
international human rights treaty by making a reservation to
provisions that are less rights-protective than domestic law.
The ICCPR includes one such provision that was appropri-
ately the subject of an express U.S. reservation; article 20
excludes hate speech and war propaganda from free speech
protection, in contrast with U.S. law. 6
The observation that Americans enjoy a relatively high
standard of human rights protection as a general matter does
not diminish the importance of looking to international
human rights law as a vehicle for securing and expanding
domestic rights. Especially in light of the Rehnquist Court's
narrow interpretation of judicially protectable rights under
the U.S. Constitution,87 in certain significant respects U.S.
rights standards are less protective than are the comparable
international norms.
While the trend of the Rehnquist Court's rulings is toward
lesser protection of rights, the trend in international human
rights law appears to be in the opposite direction. One
important area where international law is more rights-pro-
tective than domestic law is privacy, especially in the sense
of personal autonomy and decisions about sexuality. Other
areas where international human rights law is more protec-
tive than domestic law include the death penalty,89 prisoners'
rights,90 the rights of other institutionalized individuals such
as mental patients,91 and certain aspects of criminal proce-
dure.
The fact that international human rights law contains cer-
tain added rights protections, beyond those afforded by cur-
rent U.S. law, is illustrated by the additional rights
guarantees contained in the ICCPR.93 If the United States had
ratified the ICCPR without limitations on its rights-enhanc-
ing provisions, it would have expanded the rights of Ameri-
cans in the following significant respects: prohibiting the
execution of juvenile offenders94 and of pregnant women; 95
incorporating international standards of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment and punishment into U.S. law;96 requir-
ing the retroactive imposition of lighter criminal penalties; 97
affording compensation for unlawful arrests and for convic-
tions resulting from the miscarriage of justice;98 and requir-
ing jails and prisons to separate juvenile from adult
offenders and defendants awaiting trial from those who had
already been convicted.9
None of these more protective human rights standards
would have had a huge impact on United States law and
practice; however, these are significant protections accepted
by United States treaty partners and the international com-
munity. There is no compelling reason why the United States
should not give full effect to these international obligations.
The foregoing history of the impact of international human
rights law in United States law and practice demonstrates a
general resistance to the applicability of international human
rights standards in resolving domestic civil rights or civil lib-
erties controversies. The United States has supported the
development of international human rights law and institu-
tions without a concomitant commitment to the integration
of these developments into the U.S. domestic legal system.
The following recommendations address that reality and
suggest ways in which the United States' stated commitment
to international human rights can also become an actual
commitment to the people within U.S. borders.
C. Recommendations for the Clinton
Administration
1. The administration should support the early ratification
of the human rights treaties now pending in the Con-
gress and of other human rights treaties not yet submit-
ted to the Senate.
The ratification of human rights treaties is an essential step
in any strategy to make international human rights law
meaningful in the U.S. domestic context. Early ratification of
the international human rights treaties now under Senate
consideration should be a significant priority for the admin-
istration.
The United States completed the ratification process of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
in 1992. By September 1993, the United States was required
to submit its first report to the Human Rights Committee
detailing the steps it has taken to ensure compliance with the
obligations it has assumed under the Covenant. The admin-
istration should take the reporting process under the ICCPR
seriously and use its initial reports to outline an agenda for
reform of U.S. laws and practices that do not conform to the
obligations the United States has assumed in the ICCPR. (See
recommendation two below.) By the beginning of 1994 the
United States had not made its first report to the Human
Rights Committee. This delay raises concerns about the seri-
ousness of the administration's commitment to the obliga-
tions the U.S. has assumed in ratifying the ICCPR.
The Senate gave its consent to the ratification of the Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) in October
1990; however, the ratification process for this Convention
will not be complete until Congress passes implementing
legislation. Such legislation was close to passage in the
102nd Congress and at the time of this writing pending in
the House, although there has been little progress toward its
passage. Enacting legislation to implement, and hence com-
plete ratification of, CAT should be a high priority for the
administration and the Congress.
Once the ratification process is completed the administra-
tion should act promptly to fulfill U.S. obligations under
CAT, including the creation of training programs and materi-
als and other measures designed to ensure that all federal,
state, and local agencies implement the prohibitions against
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment or punishment found in CAT. The administration
should also seek the enforcement authority it needs to take
effective action against torture and other forms of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by state
and local authorities.1°°
For more than a decade, the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the American Convention on Human
Rights have been awaiting Senate approval. President Carter
forwarded them to the Senate with recommendations for rat-
ification. The Senate did not act on Carter's recommenda-
tions, and Presidents Reagan and Bush did not endorse
them.
The Clinton administration has recently endorsed ratifica-
tion of these treaties. The administration should push for
early Senate approval of them and there should be imple-
menting legislation, if necessary, to ensure domestic enforce-
ment of their guarantees. The administration has also
expressed its support for ratification of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child. The administration should now sign
the Convention and present it to the Senate for its advice and
consent.
There are several other human rights treaties that have not
yet been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.
Most important is the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, pro-
viding for the right of individual petition to the Human
Rights Committee to enforce the ICCPR's guarantees. The
Clinton administration should endorse the Optional Protocol
and submit it to the Senate for prompt consideration and
approval. People in this country should be able to file indi-
vidual petitions if they believe their rights under the ICCPR
are not being respected. This procedure would also be a
valuable means of making all government officials aware, at
all levels, of their obligations under the ICCPR.
Human rights treaties, with the notable exception of the
Convention Against Torture, have floundered in the Senate
for long periods without serious action. This administration
should change the political dynamics of the process by
pressing for expeditious Senate action on all these human
rights treaties. Ratification of these treaties is an essential
first step in the genuine incorporation of international
human rights law in the U.S. domestic legal and political
system.
2. The administration should ensure the domestic imple-
mentation of the rights guaranteed in the human rights
treaties ratified by the United States.
Ratification of human rights treaties should be viewed as a
beginning of the process of incorporating international
human rights standards and not as the end of the process. As
noted above, the United States has conditioned its ratifica-
tion of the human rights treaties it has ratified with a long
list of reservations, declarations, and understandings
designed to ensure that the treaties would have no, or very
limited, domestic effect within the United States. This policy
defeats the purposes of ratification and reinforces the view
that international human rights standards are to be applied
only to the human rights practices of other countries and not
within the United States.
The first step to remedy the damage done by the existing
package of reservations, declarations, and understandings to
the ICCPR would be to pass a "Human Rights Conformity
Act" that would implement many of the ICCPR provisions
that are now subject to the existing reservations, declara-
tions, and understandings. For example, such legislation
would prohibit the execution of offenders who were under
eighteen at the time they committed their crimes."' The
adoption of such legislation should also lead to the formal
withdrawal of many of the reservations, declarations, and
understandings now encumbering U.S. acceptance of the
ICCPR.
While it would be desirable for the United States to permit
all human rights treaties to be directly enforced by U.S.
courts without the need for such legislation, at a minimum
the ratification of the ICCPR should trigger a full scale
debate in the Congress about all of the provisions in the
ICCPR that would enhance rights protection beyond U.S.
law. Without such a serious debate U.S. ratification is purely
symbolic and has no significant domestic effect.
The same process should be initiated in connection with
the ratification of the other treaties awaiting Senate
approval. If it is impossible politically to change U.S. domes-
tic human rights law or practices through the ratification
process itself, ratification should at least require a good faith
legislative debate and decision about the extent to which the
United States will guarantee the rights in these treaties in
practice.
Many Americans appear to view the usual legislative
process as the only appropriate method for changing U.S.
domestic law and policy. Accordingly, they will not accept
the notion that treaties can become "the law of the land,"
directly enforceable in U.S. courts, but rather insist on imple-
menting legislation. Instead of viewing this two-step process
as a perversion of the Constitution, human rights advocates
should take advantage of it to develop broader political
acceptance of these international human rights standards
within the political process. The administration should foster
this process by pushing for implementing legislation to
secure all the rights embodied in the human rights treaties
the United States ratifies that are not currently protected by
U.S. law.
In some cases, there may be a legitimate debate even
among human rights advocates about whether certain provi-
sions in existing international human rights treaties would
truly advance the cause of civil liberties and civil rights in
the United States. For example, civil rights and civil liberties
groups have differed over whether the federal prosecution of
the four Los Angeles Police Department officers charged
with the beating of Rodney King, after their acquittal in state
court, is appropriate from a civil liberties perspective. Article
14(7) of the ICCPR, which would bar such a re-prosecution,
would resolve this debate in a manner that many civil rights
groups would oppose. On the other hand, the "dual sover-
eignty" doctrine that eliminates a double jeopardy defense to
such subsequent federal prosecutions has been widely criti-
cized by commentators over the years. Ratification of the
ICCPR should, at a minimum, lead to a serious debate about
the continuing legitimacy of the "dual sovereignty"
doctrine. 1°2
So far debates about the pros and cons of changing U.S.
law to reflect particular international human rights stan-
dards have been avoided in the ratification process. The
administration should ensure that such debate occurs and
should endorse the maximum acceptance of the internation-
al human rights norms in the human rights treaties the Unit-
ed States ratifies.
3. The administration should issue an executive order
requiring all federal agencies to consider U.S. interna-
tional human rights obligations and other international
human rights standards in connection with the promul-
gation of federal regulations and in connection with
their other actions.
In theory, the federal government is bound by U.S. interna-
tional obligations, customary or treaty-based, but in practice,
it is unlikely that federal agencies truly are guided by inter-
national human rights or other international obligations
when they act. The recommended executive order would
elevate the importance of international human rights obliga-
tions in the context of administrative action, at least at the
federal level. This action would be especially timely now
that the United States has ratified the ICCPR and is on the
verge, we hope, of ratifying a number of other international
human rights treaties. Even though the ICCPR has been
declared to be non-self-executing this should not prevent the
administration from insisting on full compliance with the
ICCPR in the conduct of the federal government.
In addition to requiring consideration of customary and
treaty-based human rights obligations, the executive order
should also require consideration of other international stan-
dards the United States has supported in the international
arena (that may or may not rise to the level of legal obliga-
tion) but has often forgotten in the domestic context. For
example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons should consider the
Standard Minimum Rules of Detention and other interna-
tional standards and principles applicable to the rights of
prisoners whenever it acts. There are many other examples
of internationally approved rules, guidelines, or principles
concerning a wide range of human rights issues that require
the political weight of the Presidency behind them if they are
to be taken seriously in the U.S. domestic legal system.
Such executive and administrative action can lead the way
to a wider acceptance and understanding of international
human rights law in the U.S. domestic legal system and
make it more likely that the rights recognized in the major
international human rights treaties will be fully enforced in
the U.S. domestic legal system.
4. The administration should support legislation providing
for legal and equitable remedies for violations of United
States international human rights obligations in U.S.
courts.
The enforcement of international human rights will not
truly become a reality in the United States until there are
effective judicial remedies for the violation of these rights.
This has been the U.S. experience in the context of enforcing
civil rights and civil liberties.
There should be a statute, fashioned after 42 U.S.C. section
1983, providing for liability "in an action at law, suit in equi-
ty, or other proper proceedings for redress" for violations of
internationally protected human rights committed under the
color of state or federal law.103 The Federal Tort Claims Act
should be amended to permit suits against the United States
for the violation of internationally protected human rights
by federal officials.
Such a statute could be open-ended, applying to all obliga-
tions in treaties ratified by the United States and to custom-
ary norms, or it could be more narrowly drawn to apply to
specific rights identified in advance by Congress. A more
general authorization to the courts to enforce international
human rights obligations would bring these obligations to
life more fully; however, even a more limited statute would
represent a major advance in the incorporation of interna-
tional human rights law into the U.S. domestic legal system.
The administration should also support amendments to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that would make it
possible for victims to sue foreign sovereigns in United
States courts at least for acts of torture, disappearance, or
summary execution. Under existing law, foreign sovereigns
are generally immune from suit for even the most egregious
human rights violations if these violations are committed
outside of the United States. °4 The availability of such dam-
age remedies in United States courts would be a major con-
tribution to the worldwide struggle to end these violations.
5. The administration should support legislation giving the
federal government the authority to enforce U.S. interna-
tional human rights obligations.
There are many areas where the federal government lacks
the authority to enforce international human rights obliga-
tions in the face of systematic violations by state and local
government authorities. The most dramatic example of this
enforcement gap is the absence of adequate federal enforce-
ment authority to eliminate police misconduct amounting to
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.
The only enforcement authority now possessed by the fed-
eral government in this area is to bring federal criminal civil
rights prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. The Jus-
tice Department has no civil enforcement authority in this
area. Despite efforts, Congress has failed to pass legislation
that would authorize the Justice Department to bring law-
suits to enjoin a "pattern and practice" of violations by local
officials. An important first step would be for the adminis-
tration to support police accountability legislation of the
kind that passed the House of Representatives in the 102nd
Congress.105
The federal government did not monitor or respond seri-
ously to human rights violations against prisoners in the
Reagan and Bush years. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, provides a basis for
the Justice Department to intervene in egregious cases. The
Clinton administration should vigorously enforce CRIPA as
a means of guaranteeing internationally protected rights. In
addition, the administration should support legislation to
expand the Justice Department's role regarding violations of
the international human rights of prisoners. The administra-
tion should also ensure that the federal government consis-
tently monitors conditions of prisoners and addresses
human rights violations.
These are only two examples of areas in which the admin-
istration should seek and exercise more authority in ensur-
ing that U.S. international human rights obligations are
respected in practice.
6. The administration should take executive action and sup-
port legislation to prevent kidnapping of criminal suspects
from other countries in violation of international law.
There are many instances in recent years of United States
actions at odds with its customary international human
rights law obligations. The kidnapping of Dr. Humberto
Alvarez Machain is a prominent example of such an action.
The April 1990 kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez from Mexican
territory by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents
without the consent of the Mexican government violated a
variety of customary law and treaty-based restrictions on the
exercise of law enforcement authority by the United States
on the territory of Mexico. The United States Supreme Court
decided that the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty did not
explicitly prohibit such abductions.106 The Court did not
address other international law restrictions on such abduc-
tions; however, the Court's opinion offered little hope that
U.S. courts would restrain such abductions based on interna-
tional law.
The violation of international law in the Alvarez case could
have been cured by executive action after the abduction or
by restraint in the first instance. It is important for the
administration to demonstrate its allegiance to U.S. interna-
tional law obligations in this high-profile context by issuing
an executive order banning such abductions and by support-
ing legislation prohibiting such abductions and denying U.S.
courts jurisdiction to try suspects kidnapped despite the
existence of extradition treaties or in violation of multilateral
treaties or customary law.1°7
7. The administration should file amicus curiae briefs in
appropriate cases involving international human rights
issues.
The U.S. government's brief in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala1°8 had
a significant impact on the positive decision in that case. The
brief brought a combination of the government's prestige,
resources and expertise to bear in the case. The govern-
ment's support for the human rights plaintiffs in Filartiga
made it easier for the court to find that torture was a viola-
tion of international customary law and that the recognition
of a claim for relief in U.S. courts against a foreign torturer
would not interfere with U.S. foreign policy.
The Clinton administration could play an important role in
furthering the use of international human rights standards in
U.S. courts by participating in key cases raising human
rights issues. This role would be especially important in
cases where the consideration of international human rights
standards would affect the interpretation of federal statutes.
Of greatest importance would be the statement that such
participation would make about the importance of interna-
tional human rights law in the U.S. domestic legal system.
D. Conclusion
All these recommendations are directed to the need for
leadership from the administration in accelerating the
process of the legal, political, and social acceptance of inter-
national human rights standards within the United States. It
is hypocritical for the United States to champion human
rights in international forums and in U.S. foreign policy if it
does not accept these standards within its domestic legal
system.
Even if it is not possible for the United States to embrace
all international human rights standards immediately with-
out reservation, it is essential that the United States accept
and incorporate these standards in practice to the maximum
degree possible and that the nation makes this process of
incorporation a national priority. At this point, domestic
incorporation of international human rights standards is
barely on the national agenda. If the Clinton administration
is able to put it on the national agenda, it will have accom-
plished a great deal.
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